Early in the 19th century, Richard Whately, an Oxford-educated scholar and clergyman, expanded two articles that he had composed for the Encyclopedia Metropolitana into major treatises on logic (Elements of Logic, 1826) and rhetoric (Elements of Rhetoric, 1828). This second work, extensively revised in later editions after he was appointed archbishop of Dublin, became a popular textbook, especially in the United States, and contributed to the revival of interest in classical rhetoric.

In Classical Rhetoric and Its Christian and Secular Tradition (2nd ed., 1999), George A. Kennedy describes Whately's influence on 19th-century American educators:

His observations on composition in the introduction [to Elements of Rhetoric], influenced by the romantic movement of his time, encouraged teachers to abandon set themes, imitations, and amplifications as practiced earlier and to assign free composition based on the student's experience: Whately seems to have been the first to propose the essay topic, "What I did on my summer vacation."

The complete title of Whately's book is Elements of Rhetoric: Comprising an Analysis of the Laws of Moral Evidence and of Persuasion, With Rules for Argumentative Composition and Elocution. These excerpts from the opening chapters of Part Two ("Of Persuasion") are taken from the expanded seventh edition, published in 1846. As Whately acknowledges, his reflections on the validity of emotional appeals (known in classical rhetoric as pathos) show the influence of both Aristotle (384-322 B.C.) and the notable Scottish rhetorician George Campbell (1719-1796).

Pathos and Persuasion: The Validity of Emotional Appeals

From Part Two of Elements of Rhetoric by Richard Whately

Persuasion, properly so called, i.e., the art of influencing the will, is the next point to be considered. . . . [I]n order that the will may be influenced, two things are requisite; viz., (1) that the proposed object should appear desirable, and (2) that the means suggested should be proved to be conducive to the attainment of that object; and this last evidently must depend on a process of reasoning. In order, for example, to induce the Greeks to unite their efforts against the Persian invader, it was necessary both to prove that co-operation could alone render their resistance effectual, and also to awaken such feelings of patriotism and abhorrence of a foreign yoke as might prompt them to make these combined efforts. For it is evident, that however ardent their love of liberty, they would make no exertions if they apprehended no danger; or if they thought themselves able, separately, to defend themselves, they would be backward to join the confederacy; and, on the other hand, that if they were willing to submit to the Persian yoke, or valued their independence less than their present ease, the fullest conviction that the means recommended would secure their independence, would have had no practical effect.

Exhortation

Persuasion, therefore, depends on, first, argument (to prove the expediency of the means proposed), and, secondly, what is usually called exhortation, that is, the excitement of men to adopt those means, by representing the end as sufficiently desirable. It will happen, indeed, not unfrequently, that the one or the other of these objects will have been already, either wholly or in part, accomplished; so that the other shall be the only one that it is requisite to insist on; viz., sometimes the hearers will be sufficiently intent on the pursuit of the end, and will be in doubt only as to the means of attaining it; and sometimes, again, they will have no doubt on that point, but will be indifferent, or not sufficiently ardent, with respect to the proposed end, and will need to be stimulated by exhortations. Not sufficiently ardent, I have said, because it will not so often happen that the object in question will be one to which they are totally indifferent, as that they will, practically at least, not reckon it, or not feel it to be worth the requisite pains. No one is absolutely indifferent about the attainment of a happy immortality; and yet a great part of the preacher's business consists in exhortation, that is, endeavoring to induce men to use those exertions which they themselves know to be necessary for the attainment of it.

Passions

Aristotle and many other writers have spoken of appeals to the passions as an unfair mode of influencing the hearers, in answer to which Dr. [George] Campbell has remarked that there can be no persuasion without an address to the passions*; and it is evident, from what has been just said, that he is right, if under the term passion be included every active principle of our nature. This, however, is a greater latitude of meaning than belongs even to the Greek word; though the signification of that is wider than, according to ordinary use, that of our term "passions."

* <sub>"To say, that it is possible to persuade without speaking to the passions is but at best a kind of specious nonsense. The coolest reasoner always in persuading, addresseth himself to the passions some way or other. This he cannot avoid doing, if he speak to the purpose. To make me believe, it is enough to show me that things are so; to make me act, it is necessary to show that the action will answer some end. That can never be an end to me which gratifies no passion or affection in my nature. You assure me 'It is for my honour.' Now you solicit my pride, without which I had never been able to understand the word. You say, 'It is for my interest.' Now you bespeak my self-love. 'It is for the public good.' Now you rouse my patriotism. 'It will relieve the miserable.' Now you touch my pity. So far therefore is it from being an unfair method of persuasion to move the passions, that there is no persuasion without moving them.

"But if so much depend on passion, where is the scope for argument? Before I answer this question, let it be observed, that, in order to persuade, there are two things which must be carefully studied by the orator. The first is, to excite some desire or passion in the hearers; the second is, to satisfy their judgment that there is a connexion between the action to which he would persuade them, and the gratification of the desire or passion which he excites. This is the analysis of persuasion. The former is effected by communicating lively and glowing ideas of the object; the latter, unless so evident of itself as to supersede the necessity, by presenting the best and most forcible arguments which the nature of the subject admits. In the one lies the pathetic, in the other the argumentative. These incorporated together constitute that vehemence of contention to which the greatest exploits of eloquence ought doubtless to be ascribed."—Campbell's Philosophy of Rhetoric, Book I, Chapter 7</sub>

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