5.
Meddling with the Mehdi - the "surge into the abyss.
" Bush and Maliki and others are banking on the idea that they can split, isolate and thus defeat Muqtada al-Sadr's Mehdi Army.
They calculate that Muqtada al-Sadr and his forces represent the key destabilizing factor in the Iraqi equation and the force which has to be disabled before progress towards a stable political base can be laid for future progress on security, economic and nation re-building.
The fact that Abdul-Aziz Al-Hakim, Leader of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq has now verbally put his weight behind Maliki's proposal to disarm and disband all militias, appears to have given them the wherewithal, to lead a massive assault on Sadr City and crush the Mehdi Army.
His defeat would also mark a massive psychological setback for other insurgent and militia groups.
It would re-establish the domination of US forces on the ground and allow them to steadily mop up other elements, especially the Sunni groups Maliki and others like Abdul-Aziz Al-Hakim appear to be hoping that the US will still continue to strike mostly at the Sunnis and weaken Muqtada al-Sadr sufficiently to secure their positions.
They hope that by the end of the operation in the summer, when US troops will withdraw to barracks, the Iraqi Army could then be systematically taken over totally by their own militias and would provide a force strong to concretise a Shia-led state, while the US would lead the destruction of the Sunnis and Al Qaeda in Anbar province.
Certainly, one shouldn't underestimate their capacities for creative thinking and optimistic imaginations.
It is not at all sure they will last out in office till the Spring, let alone summer.
If, as likely, the battle becomes a fiasco of fantastic proportions, most probably, Maliki will escape to comfortable exile and Al-Hakim will attempt to reverse the erosion of his power base by striking an alliance with his arch competitor, Muqtada al-Sadr.
However, despite the verbal support of Al-Hakim's, it is the US troops who will have take on the real battle in Sadr city.
The personal influence of Al-Hakim as a popular cleric and competitor to Muqtada al-Sadr, plus his own militia of around 10,000 members will not be enough alone to undermine the huge social reserves and military capabilities of the Mehdi Army.
Furthermore, Al-Hakim and Maliki risk forever tainting themselves as lackeys of America if they stand fast when the incursion begins.
Yet, the Americans may be totally misreading the dynamics of the situation and the task which confronts them.
Sadr City is a relative haven for the Shia living there under the protection of the Mehdi Army.
The population will view an assault as an attempt to strip them of their last defences against the ravages of the anarchy in Baghdad.
The local population may well throw their weight and swell the ranks of the already huge Mehdi Army in order to fight to defend to the death what has become almost their own "state.
" As we have said, it is unlikely that the Iraqi Army would hold together, and many units might go over to the Sadrists or refuse to fight.
The battle for the Sadr City could become a cause célèbre for the whole Shia "nation.
" Shia public opinion around the whole of the country could rally to support their brethren under American attack andthis could see a closing of ranks, wherein the various competing Shia militias would merge or form fighting alliances together to focus on striking US forces throughout Baghdad and other parts of Iraq.
It is interesting to note that on the other side of the sectarian divide in the battle of Haifa Street, the fight came on the heels of the Sunni nationalist revival following the execution of Saddam Hussein, and for the first time saw up to a dozen disparate and often violently competitive insurgent groups forming a solid alliance against the US and Iraqi troops.
Sadr city could be the "surge into the abyss" for the US and spell the final death knell of Iraq as a country.
Parallels will be drawn with the battle for the Warsaw ghetto or the Russian assault on Grozny.
The only way that they could hope to "win" would be pursue a scorched earth policy.
It will spell the end for Maliki, whatever he imagines.
The government will fall and Al-Hakim's support will evaporate along with his Badr Corps, who will like side with the Mehdi Army.
At the same time the Sunni insurgents would take advantage of the overstretched US forces to face them down in other areas of Baghdad, Al Anbar province and other areas.
Despite US and British hopes, the new offensive will not be contained to Baghdad and Al Anbar.
As the US tries to take control of areas of the capital city, whole provinces, some previously calm, will be liberated or will descend into both war and civil war.
It will spread throughout the country.
US forces will be totally overstretched.
Mosul and other cities will explode.
Kirkuk will become a sectarian killing field.
In the south, especially in Basra, where Blair has been hoping to quietly sneak away, the idea that British troops can somehow quietly hand over power to the Iraqi Army and begin packing their bags or retreat to safe barracks, while at the same time Bush pursues his offensive in Baghdad, will be exposed as another example of Alliance myopia.
Existing Shia militia in-fighting in the south may initially intensify at first, but groups will be forced to vie with one another in the ferocity of their assaults on the British forces.
The intensification of the whole situation will likely result in the local Armed Forces and police publicly dissolving into respective militias.
Given the wave of hatred towards the United States which will sweep the country, it is fantasy to imagine that the troops of its principal ally will be allowed to simply sit comfortably in their canteens in these circumstances.
In the second city of Basra and across the Shia south of the country, they will become the key focus for revenge on the foreign occupiers.
Rather than beginning their peaceful withdrawal from Iraq, the small British force of 7,000 troops is more likely to driven out and/or slaughtered.
Finally, mention should also be made about the situation with the Kurds.
Until now they have been treated by both the US and Iraqi administrations as a "done-deal" for a province where everything was effectively hunky-dory.
It is true that the autonomous region enjoys far less violence than anywhere else and that, in general, there is nothing like the Shia/Sunni antagonism that exists between them and the other groups.
However, there is considerable disquiet below the surface and it is impossible for them to unaffected by the events in their own country or left untouched by the widening violence.
The truth is that the Kurds have been quietly settling their own accounts for decades of abuse by Hussein and have been re-populating areas previously Arabized.
The north of the country is extremely mixed between dominant Kurds, Arabs, Turkomans and Christians.
The re-Kurdishization of areas within and beyond the autonomous region has brought a backlash from other groups which is becoming increasing violent and sectarian.
The city of Kirkuk is hotly disputed, lying outside the Kurdish area, but heavily populated by Kurds, and, which the Kurds wish to annex against the wishes of the rest of the inhabitants.
A referendum is set for this year and it could well be the spark for a massive conflagration in the city and in the surrounding northern areas.
The recent execution of Saddam Hussein has also increased the cynicism and mistrust toward both the Iraqi government and Americans.
For reasons different to those of the Sunnis, the execution was seen as "Shia justice" because of the fact the Kurds were robbed of the chance of having Hussein sit trial for his crimes of gassing the Kurds en masse.
There is great suspicion, and rightly so, that much of this also had to do with the fact that in such a trial the evidence would come to light that Saddam Hussein was supplied with the chemicals by the Americans, who at that time were his allies in the war on Iran.
Should the referendum in Kirkuk be annulled by the Iraqi government or its results not accepted and, if the inter-communal violence starts to involve other Arab militias, there is a chance that the situation could become highly combustible and what until now has been acceptance of autonomy could start to become a demand for independence, especially as the rest of Iraq begins to disintegrate and paralysis continues over oil revenues and oil development in the Kurdish region.
6.
Potential Trajectories - variations on anarchy & chaos The advantages of time, information and moral enjoyed by the insurgents could pose to other variants to differing degrees in the perspectives for the coming offensive.
One is that the omens of Armageddon suggested above are largely avoided, simply because the insurgents and militias decide to melt away and disengage temporarily, only to reappear with new ferocity in the summer when the US troops are returned to barracks and only the weak and sectarian Iraqi Army and police are on the streets.
The second option, which has already been applied to some degree before, would to withdraw from combat in Baghdad and instead use the opportunity to shift some of their resources and spread the war more nation-wide, especially intensifying violence in other major cities and towns, and in, what until now, were relatively calm provinces.
If this were the case, of these two possibilities, the second would seem to be the most likely.
Militarily it would stretch US resources to breaking point, take the pressure off areas of Baghdad, allow propaganda victories to the insurgents and most especially find an avenue for a process of violence which has its own level of independent momentum and which cannot simply be turned on and off like a tap.
When all is said and done, the fact is that Bush's "new-old" strategy has more change of succeeding than climate change has of being reversed in the next six months.
There is no chance of establishing security, without which political "solutions" and economic initiatives are little more than pie in the sky.
The policy of "demobilizing militias" by offering fruitful social work would be a joke if the situation were not so tragic.
It smacks of some initiative to reduce drugs and gang violence in some medium size American city.
Giving 1 $billion to help a jobs programme is hardly going to have any effect between now and the coming 6 month offensive.
Whether they promise to throw one or ten billion dollars at schemes doesn't matter.
Hundreds of billions of dollars have already been thrown at it and they have failed to make a difference and/or have disappeared into bottomless pockets of incompetence, bureaucracy and institutional crime.
The same awaits the fate of this little trinket.
Exactly the same is true of the two key aims of political stabilisation and community reconciliation that the military offensive aims to achieve.
The fact is that as far as both establishing a functioning, stable government and achieving appeasement between Shias and Sunnis are concerned, the point of no return has already been passed.
Avoiding the dismemberment of Iraq is not even any longer possible.
Not until the Americans withdraw can any progress be made on these issue, since their presence dishonours the whole nation and is held responsible for much of the chaos and violence in the country.
Secondly, and tragically, it is necessary to face up to the horrific fact that matters have now gone so far that massive sectarian violence is simply unavoidable.
To put it brutally, before any form of reconciliation can begin there will have to be a showdown between the two communities.
Like it or not, inter-communal hatred has reached such a stage that all political initiatives aimed at alleviating it are just empty rhetoric and liberal posturing to which almost nobody gives one iota of notice.
Repulsive and hideous as it may be, there will be no base for reconciliation until the streets of Baghdad run thick with the torrents of blood gushing from the neck wounds and disembowelled corpses of tens of thousands of Shia and Sunnis.
Only when such an orgy of bloodlust has been satisfied, will the limbic tensions underpinning the dispute finally begin to dissipate and the way will slowly be laid for reconciliation.
This was the case in Beirut, in Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Sierra Leone.
Countries which like Iraq had previously prided themselves on the absence of everyday communal conflict between its citizens.
Until the inevitability of the break of Iraq is recognized and accepted, no progress can be made.
Although it will result in ferocious fighting, perhaps, if it was prosecuted actively as a policy, it would be the only chance of reducing the scale of the coming bloodbath.
However, whatever is done now the dynamics of the situation are really beyond the control of any external actors and developments in Iraq are essentially driven by their own self-organizing and self-motivating logic born of the deep chaos there.
It will be a long, long time before any new order can arise from the current disorder.
In the words of Nobel Prize winner and Chaos Theory expert, Ilya Prigogine, " History is branded with the mark of radical uncertainty.
" 7.
Phase Regression - the beginning of the end for democracy? Like some gambling addict with a state of denial verging on psychotic delusion, Bush has gambled the last $20,000 of the family's assets on an all or nothing bet.
He is now committed to the hilt.
He has no choice but to go for a real offensive.
Given he now has the public backing of Maliki and Al-Hakim, he is obliged to go in hard.
He does not have the choice to ship the troops in and let them hang around.
But he may well find also that his erstwhile Iraqi allies will jump ship or switch sides as soon as the game heats up.
One does have to admit that when introducing his new strategy to the nation, there was some truth in the social horrors which Bush warned of if US troops failed to intervene.
But the problem is that his explanation is about as pathetic as the gambler pleading for understanding for the consequences for his family if his last bet fails.
It doesn't make it right.
Indeed, even if the gambler wins, he has lost, because the value of the gains are superficial, when the true issue is not his lack of luck, but his sickness and the dysfunctional behaviour and socially damaging effects that flow from it.
Once one begins a war on false premises, lies and deceptions everything one does must turn into the opposite of what is intended.
Sure enough, finally your only options left are, "I'm dammed if I do and I dammed if I don't.
" But by deciding yet again to engage in a process over which all control has been irredeemably lost, the consequences are that things are made even worse than the horrible alternative painted by Bush.
The new strategy is a surge into the abyss.
What will be a nightmare anyway in Iraq, becomes an even more perverse horror story, with the US playing the role of whipping boy.
How has Bush been allowed to turn "democracy" into a dirty word? Having gone to for "freedom and democracy" he has discredit its name worldwide.
Having gone to war on terror, he has strengthened it worldwide.
Having aimed at stabilizing the Middle East, he has turned it into a source of insecurity worldwide.
Having suffered its own ground zero, Bush has turned the birthplace of civilisation into ground zero.
The rest of the world is wondering just how the planet's most advanced nation could have allowed a person of such calibre to be given the position and powers to wreak such reckless, thoughtless and devastating destruction.
How will he be remembered? As the man who began the end of the epoch of democracy.
This is not just a defeat for the United States, but a defeat for the human race.
Meddling with the Mehdi - the "surge into the abyss.
" Bush and Maliki and others are banking on the idea that they can split, isolate and thus defeat Muqtada al-Sadr's Mehdi Army.
They calculate that Muqtada al-Sadr and his forces represent the key destabilizing factor in the Iraqi equation and the force which has to be disabled before progress towards a stable political base can be laid for future progress on security, economic and nation re-building.
The fact that Abdul-Aziz Al-Hakim, Leader of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq has now verbally put his weight behind Maliki's proposal to disarm and disband all militias, appears to have given them the wherewithal, to lead a massive assault on Sadr City and crush the Mehdi Army.
His defeat would also mark a massive psychological setback for other insurgent and militia groups.
It would re-establish the domination of US forces on the ground and allow them to steadily mop up other elements, especially the Sunni groups Maliki and others like Abdul-Aziz Al-Hakim appear to be hoping that the US will still continue to strike mostly at the Sunnis and weaken Muqtada al-Sadr sufficiently to secure their positions.
They hope that by the end of the operation in the summer, when US troops will withdraw to barracks, the Iraqi Army could then be systematically taken over totally by their own militias and would provide a force strong to concretise a Shia-led state, while the US would lead the destruction of the Sunnis and Al Qaeda in Anbar province.
Certainly, one shouldn't underestimate their capacities for creative thinking and optimistic imaginations.
It is not at all sure they will last out in office till the Spring, let alone summer.
If, as likely, the battle becomes a fiasco of fantastic proportions, most probably, Maliki will escape to comfortable exile and Al-Hakim will attempt to reverse the erosion of his power base by striking an alliance with his arch competitor, Muqtada al-Sadr.
However, despite the verbal support of Al-Hakim's, it is the US troops who will have take on the real battle in Sadr city.
The personal influence of Al-Hakim as a popular cleric and competitor to Muqtada al-Sadr, plus his own militia of around 10,000 members will not be enough alone to undermine the huge social reserves and military capabilities of the Mehdi Army.
Furthermore, Al-Hakim and Maliki risk forever tainting themselves as lackeys of America if they stand fast when the incursion begins.
Yet, the Americans may be totally misreading the dynamics of the situation and the task which confronts them.
Sadr City is a relative haven for the Shia living there under the protection of the Mehdi Army.
The population will view an assault as an attempt to strip them of their last defences against the ravages of the anarchy in Baghdad.
The local population may well throw their weight and swell the ranks of the already huge Mehdi Army in order to fight to defend to the death what has become almost their own "state.
" As we have said, it is unlikely that the Iraqi Army would hold together, and many units might go over to the Sadrists or refuse to fight.
The battle for the Sadr City could become a cause célèbre for the whole Shia "nation.
" Shia public opinion around the whole of the country could rally to support their brethren under American attack andthis could see a closing of ranks, wherein the various competing Shia militias would merge or form fighting alliances together to focus on striking US forces throughout Baghdad and other parts of Iraq.
It is interesting to note that on the other side of the sectarian divide in the battle of Haifa Street, the fight came on the heels of the Sunni nationalist revival following the execution of Saddam Hussein, and for the first time saw up to a dozen disparate and often violently competitive insurgent groups forming a solid alliance against the US and Iraqi troops.
Sadr city could be the "surge into the abyss" for the US and spell the final death knell of Iraq as a country.
Parallels will be drawn with the battle for the Warsaw ghetto or the Russian assault on Grozny.
The only way that they could hope to "win" would be pursue a scorched earth policy.
It will spell the end for Maliki, whatever he imagines.
The government will fall and Al-Hakim's support will evaporate along with his Badr Corps, who will like side with the Mehdi Army.
At the same time the Sunni insurgents would take advantage of the overstretched US forces to face them down in other areas of Baghdad, Al Anbar province and other areas.
Despite US and British hopes, the new offensive will not be contained to Baghdad and Al Anbar.
As the US tries to take control of areas of the capital city, whole provinces, some previously calm, will be liberated or will descend into both war and civil war.
It will spread throughout the country.
US forces will be totally overstretched.
Mosul and other cities will explode.
Kirkuk will become a sectarian killing field.
In the south, especially in Basra, where Blair has been hoping to quietly sneak away, the idea that British troops can somehow quietly hand over power to the Iraqi Army and begin packing their bags or retreat to safe barracks, while at the same time Bush pursues his offensive in Baghdad, will be exposed as another example of Alliance myopia.
Existing Shia militia in-fighting in the south may initially intensify at first, but groups will be forced to vie with one another in the ferocity of their assaults on the British forces.
The intensification of the whole situation will likely result in the local Armed Forces and police publicly dissolving into respective militias.
Given the wave of hatred towards the United States which will sweep the country, it is fantasy to imagine that the troops of its principal ally will be allowed to simply sit comfortably in their canteens in these circumstances.
In the second city of Basra and across the Shia south of the country, they will become the key focus for revenge on the foreign occupiers.
Rather than beginning their peaceful withdrawal from Iraq, the small British force of 7,000 troops is more likely to driven out and/or slaughtered.
Finally, mention should also be made about the situation with the Kurds.
Until now they have been treated by both the US and Iraqi administrations as a "done-deal" for a province where everything was effectively hunky-dory.
It is true that the autonomous region enjoys far less violence than anywhere else and that, in general, there is nothing like the Shia/Sunni antagonism that exists between them and the other groups.
However, there is considerable disquiet below the surface and it is impossible for them to unaffected by the events in their own country or left untouched by the widening violence.
The truth is that the Kurds have been quietly settling their own accounts for decades of abuse by Hussein and have been re-populating areas previously Arabized.
The north of the country is extremely mixed between dominant Kurds, Arabs, Turkomans and Christians.
The re-Kurdishization of areas within and beyond the autonomous region has brought a backlash from other groups which is becoming increasing violent and sectarian.
The city of Kirkuk is hotly disputed, lying outside the Kurdish area, but heavily populated by Kurds, and, which the Kurds wish to annex against the wishes of the rest of the inhabitants.
A referendum is set for this year and it could well be the spark for a massive conflagration in the city and in the surrounding northern areas.
The recent execution of Saddam Hussein has also increased the cynicism and mistrust toward both the Iraqi government and Americans.
For reasons different to those of the Sunnis, the execution was seen as "Shia justice" because of the fact the Kurds were robbed of the chance of having Hussein sit trial for his crimes of gassing the Kurds en masse.
There is great suspicion, and rightly so, that much of this also had to do with the fact that in such a trial the evidence would come to light that Saddam Hussein was supplied with the chemicals by the Americans, who at that time were his allies in the war on Iran.
Should the referendum in Kirkuk be annulled by the Iraqi government or its results not accepted and, if the inter-communal violence starts to involve other Arab militias, there is a chance that the situation could become highly combustible and what until now has been acceptance of autonomy could start to become a demand for independence, especially as the rest of Iraq begins to disintegrate and paralysis continues over oil revenues and oil development in the Kurdish region.
6.
Potential Trajectories - variations on anarchy & chaos The advantages of time, information and moral enjoyed by the insurgents could pose to other variants to differing degrees in the perspectives for the coming offensive.
One is that the omens of Armageddon suggested above are largely avoided, simply because the insurgents and militias decide to melt away and disengage temporarily, only to reappear with new ferocity in the summer when the US troops are returned to barracks and only the weak and sectarian Iraqi Army and police are on the streets.
The second option, which has already been applied to some degree before, would to withdraw from combat in Baghdad and instead use the opportunity to shift some of their resources and spread the war more nation-wide, especially intensifying violence in other major cities and towns, and in, what until now, were relatively calm provinces.
If this were the case, of these two possibilities, the second would seem to be the most likely.
Militarily it would stretch US resources to breaking point, take the pressure off areas of Baghdad, allow propaganda victories to the insurgents and most especially find an avenue for a process of violence which has its own level of independent momentum and which cannot simply be turned on and off like a tap.
When all is said and done, the fact is that Bush's "new-old" strategy has more change of succeeding than climate change has of being reversed in the next six months.
There is no chance of establishing security, without which political "solutions" and economic initiatives are little more than pie in the sky.
The policy of "demobilizing militias" by offering fruitful social work would be a joke if the situation were not so tragic.
It smacks of some initiative to reduce drugs and gang violence in some medium size American city.
Giving 1 $billion to help a jobs programme is hardly going to have any effect between now and the coming 6 month offensive.
Whether they promise to throw one or ten billion dollars at schemes doesn't matter.
Hundreds of billions of dollars have already been thrown at it and they have failed to make a difference and/or have disappeared into bottomless pockets of incompetence, bureaucracy and institutional crime.
The same awaits the fate of this little trinket.
Exactly the same is true of the two key aims of political stabilisation and community reconciliation that the military offensive aims to achieve.
The fact is that as far as both establishing a functioning, stable government and achieving appeasement between Shias and Sunnis are concerned, the point of no return has already been passed.
Avoiding the dismemberment of Iraq is not even any longer possible.
Not until the Americans withdraw can any progress be made on these issue, since their presence dishonours the whole nation and is held responsible for much of the chaos and violence in the country.
Secondly, and tragically, it is necessary to face up to the horrific fact that matters have now gone so far that massive sectarian violence is simply unavoidable.
To put it brutally, before any form of reconciliation can begin there will have to be a showdown between the two communities.
Like it or not, inter-communal hatred has reached such a stage that all political initiatives aimed at alleviating it are just empty rhetoric and liberal posturing to which almost nobody gives one iota of notice.
Repulsive and hideous as it may be, there will be no base for reconciliation until the streets of Baghdad run thick with the torrents of blood gushing from the neck wounds and disembowelled corpses of tens of thousands of Shia and Sunnis.
Only when such an orgy of bloodlust has been satisfied, will the limbic tensions underpinning the dispute finally begin to dissipate and the way will slowly be laid for reconciliation.
This was the case in Beirut, in Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Sierra Leone.
Countries which like Iraq had previously prided themselves on the absence of everyday communal conflict between its citizens.
Until the inevitability of the break of Iraq is recognized and accepted, no progress can be made.
Although it will result in ferocious fighting, perhaps, if it was prosecuted actively as a policy, it would be the only chance of reducing the scale of the coming bloodbath.
However, whatever is done now the dynamics of the situation are really beyond the control of any external actors and developments in Iraq are essentially driven by their own self-organizing and self-motivating logic born of the deep chaos there.
It will be a long, long time before any new order can arise from the current disorder.
In the words of Nobel Prize winner and Chaos Theory expert, Ilya Prigogine, " History is branded with the mark of radical uncertainty.
" 7.
Phase Regression - the beginning of the end for democracy? Like some gambling addict with a state of denial verging on psychotic delusion, Bush has gambled the last $20,000 of the family's assets on an all or nothing bet.
He is now committed to the hilt.
He has no choice but to go for a real offensive.
Given he now has the public backing of Maliki and Al-Hakim, he is obliged to go in hard.
He does not have the choice to ship the troops in and let them hang around.
But he may well find also that his erstwhile Iraqi allies will jump ship or switch sides as soon as the game heats up.
One does have to admit that when introducing his new strategy to the nation, there was some truth in the social horrors which Bush warned of if US troops failed to intervene.
But the problem is that his explanation is about as pathetic as the gambler pleading for understanding for the consequences for his family if his last bet fails.
It doesn't make it right.
Indeed, even if the gambler wins, he has lost, because the value of the gains are superficial, when the true issue is not his lack of luck, but his sickness and the dysfunctional behaviour and socially damaging effects that flow from it.
Once one begins a war on false premises, lies and deceptions everything one does must turn into the opposite of what is intended.
Sure enough, finally your only options left are, "I'm dammed if I do and I dammed if I don't.
" But by deciding yet again to engage in a process over which all control has been irredeemably lost, the consequences are that things are made even worse than the horrible alternative painted by Bush.
The new strategy is a surge into the abyss.
What will be a nightmare anyway in Iraq, becomes an even more perverse horror story, with the US playing the role of whipping boy.
How has Bush been allowed to turn "democracy" into a dirty word? Having gone to for "freedom and democracy" he has discredit its name worldwide.
Having gone to war on terror, he has strengthened it worldwide.
Having aimed at stabilizing the Middle East, he has turned it into a source of insecurity worldwide.
Having suffered its own ground zero, Bush has turned the birthplace of civilisation into ground zero.
The rest of the world is wondering just how the planet's most advanced nation could have allowed a person of such calibre to be given the position and powers to wreak such reckless, thoughtless and devastating destruction.
How will he be remembered? As the man who began the end of the epoch of democracy.
This is not just a defeat for the United States, but a defeat for the human race.
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